

**U.S. Army Research Institute  
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

**Research Report 1855**

**Army Green: Training Non-Tactical Problem Solving  
by Platoon Leaders**

**Robin K. Hinkle**  
University of Louisville  
Consortium Research Fellows Program

**Angela I. Karrasch**  
Center for Army Leadership

**Thomas J. Burke**  
Western Kentucky University  
Consortium Research Fellows Program

**July 2006**

**20060915027**

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**U.S. Army Research Institute  
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

**A Directorate of the Department of the Army  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G1**

Authorized and approved for distribution:



**STEPHEN GOLDBERG  
Acting Technical Director**



**MICHELLE SAMS  
Acting Director**

---

Technical review by

Peter S. Schaefer, U.S. Army Research Institute  
James Ness, United States Military Academy

**NOTICES**

**DISTRIBUTION:** Primary distribution of this Research Report has been made by ARI. Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Attn: DAPE-ARI-MS, 2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926

**FINAL DISPOSITION:** This Research Report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

**NOTE:** The findings in this Research Report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE								
1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy) July 2006	2. REPORT TYPE Final	3. DATES COVERED (from... to) August 2004 - June 2006						
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Army Green: Training Non-Tactical Problem Solving by Platoon Leaders				5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER				
				5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 622785				
6. AUTHOR(S)  Robin K. Hinkle (University of Louisville), Angela I. Karrasch (Center for Army Leadership), and Thomas J. Burke (Western Kentucky University)				5c. PROJECT NUMBER A790				
				5d. TASK NUMBER 211				
				5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences ATTN: DAPE-ARI-IK 121 Morande Street Fort Knox, KY 40121-4141				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER				
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 2511 Jefferson Davis Highway Arlington, VA 22202-3926				10. MONITOR ACRONYM ARI				
				11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER Research Report 1855				
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.								
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  Subject Matter POC: Dr. Carl W. Lickteig								
14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)  Platoon leaders (PL) are often required to resolve non-tactical problems on which they have received little to no formal training. Many of these non-tactical problems are atypical, undocumented, and require judgmental resolution by PLs with limited experience as they take command of their first platoon. In addition, the unpredictable nature of military operations including non-tactical situations requires PLs to repeatedly adapt their thinking to resolve unfamiliar, and sometimes unforeseeable, problems and concerns. Therefore, the 16th Cavalry Regimental Commander requested Technical Advisory Service to develop non-tactical training for new PLs. In response, methods for theme-based training used to train adaptive thinking in tactical situations from the Think Like a Commander (TLAC) program were adapted for non-tactical situations and the development of a training program called Army Green. Through a series of interviews and surveys, 231 captains and lieutenants (LT) identified values, problems, and situations relevant to the non-tactical issues that confront PLs. As a result, 10 themes and 10 problem-laden vignettes along with expert solutions were developed for Army Green. An Army Green training assessment with 12 LTs resulted in promising, but preliminary findings that indicated a few hours of theme-based discussion of problems embedded in non-tactical vignettes improved LTs' responses to subsequent problems. The report concludes with a brief set of recommendations to help refine and implement Army Green training.								
15. SUBJECT TERMS Ethics      Adaptive Thinking      Themes      Platoon Leaders      Non-Tactical      Values      Training      Human Performance								
16. REPORT Unclassified				17. ABSTRACT Unclassified	18. THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	20. NUMBER OF PAGES 37	21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON Ellen Kinzer Technical Publication Specialist 703-602-8047
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF								



**Army Green: Training Non-Tactical Problem Solving  
by Platoon Leaders**

**Robin K. Hinkle**  
University of Louisville  
Consortium Research Fellows Program

**Angela I. Karrasch**  
Center for Army Leadership

**Thomas J. Burke**  
Western Kentucky University  
Consortium Research Fellows Program

**Armored Forces Research Unit**  
**Barbara A. Black, Chief**

**U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**  
**2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926**

**July 2006**

---

**Army Project Number**  
**622785A790**

**Personnel Performance  
and Training Technology**

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



## ARMY GREEN: TRAINING NON-TACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING BY PLATOON LEADERS

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### Research Requirement:

The expanding role of small units in the contemporary operating environment has resulted in junior officers facing challenges of unprecedented complexity and responsibility. Formal instruction provides junior officers with a solid foundation of tactical knowledge to perform successfully on the battlefield. However, lieutenants (LTs) serving as new platoon leaders (PLs) are routinely required to resolve non-tactical problems. Many of these non-tactical problems are beyond the formal training and education received prior to taking a platoon. To arrive at an effective resolution the officers must adapt and expand their existing skill set to operate in unfamiliar and at times unpredictable situations. The current research fulfilled a request by the 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment to develop theme-based training for LTs that would address the non-tactical problems that PLs encounter.

#### Procedure:

The research was conducted in two phases. The first phase was training development in which themes and vignettes were created for a training program called Army Green. Survey and interview responses from 190 LTs and 41 captains (CPTs) were used to develop representative non-tactical situations and problems that confront new PLs as well as thematic considerations for resolving them. Surveys, based on the U.S. Army's leadership doctrine, were conducted with LTs and CPTs to develop a draft set of themes (i.e., Know Your Soldiers, Be Proactive). Interviews were also conducted with 21 CPTs to identify the problems and situations they felt ill-prepared to manage when they were PLs. The CPT's problems and situations became the basis for the 10 vignettes. Next, a 5-person focus group of SMEs refined and integrated the interview and survey responses, resulting in a set of training materials that featured 10 themes and 10 vignettes.

The second phase was training assessment. For the assessment a sample of 12 LTs participated in a series of 10 sessions that required each LT to provide a written response to each vignette and then participate in a group discussion on their recommended course of action (COA) for resolving the problem posed by the vignette. The first two sessions served as the pre-test, the next six sessions served as the training, and the final two sessions served as the post-test. During the first two sessions, discussions focused on participants' COAs without any explicit introduction or consideration of the themes. After the second session, the researchers introduced the themes and discussed their relevance to solving the problems presented in the vignettes. For the remaining sessions, the COA discussions were oriented towards the themes. After the sessions, three majors rated the LTs' written responses on the pre-test and post-test vignettes. Ratings were made on three dependent variables: Analysis of the Situation, Quality of the

Solution, and Leadership Behaviors. These ratings were averaged by the researchers to form a composite variable referred to as Adaptive Thinking.

Findings:

Presentation and discussion of the themes improved the LTs overall responses to the post-test vignettes. However, the improvement from pre-test to post-test was significant only for the composite variable and one of the three dependent variables, namely Leadership Behaviors. Military experience appeared to have no effect on pre-test measures of non-tactical problem solving. However, military experience was positively related to post-test ratings, suggesting that time in service makes one more responsive to Army Green-type training. In sum, the training assessment findings are quite promising and interesting, but require further confirmation and exploration.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

The user-based nature of Army Green is a key strength for its potential utilization. The resulting 10 themes and 10 vignettes from this initial Army Green effort provide a solid base for future research and refinement. Future research should determine more precisely the themes and values needed to successfully resolve non-tactical problems. The results reported here indicate that a few hours of theme-based discussion on problem-laden vignettes improved LTs' responses to subsequent non-tactical problems. However, future research might assess the degree to which value-based decision making is amenable to training.

Army Green was developed to foster adaptive problem solving for the many and varied problems faced by junior officers, particularly PLs, in non-tactical situations. Extension of Army Green beyond PLs may be warranted. A PL and platoon sergeant (PSG) for example, might through mutual discussion of the Army Green themes and vignettes, align their values and decisions in dealing with the unit's non-tactical problems. Involving their company commander (CC) in this process may also prove beneficial and resolve some questions that only the CC has the knowledge or authority to answer. Other recommendations are to examine the use of Army Green with the entire platoon and to shift the interactive methods from discussion to role playing.

The potential of Army Green may be most fully realized through web-based training. Currently, Army Green training based on the materials and methods reported here is available and ongoing at the U.S. Army's Leadership Development website. Future efforts should extend and refine Army Green materials and methods to develop the non-tactical skills so increasingly important for small-unit leaders in the widening spectrum of military operations.

# ARMY GREEN: TRAINING NON-TACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING BY PLATOON LEADERS

## CONTENTS

---

	Page
Introduction.....	1
Background.....	1
Adaptive Thinking for Tactical Skills – TLAC .....	3
Adaptive Thinking for Non-Tactical Skills – Army Green .....	3
Adaptive Leadership Behaviors.....	4
Army Values .....	4
Platoon – Level Values .....	4
Summary .....	5
Method .....	5
Training Development .....	5
Theme and Vignette Development .....	6
Refinement Using a Focus Group.....	8
Training Assessment.....	10
Training.....	10
Assessment.....	11
Results.....	11
Reliability Analyses .....	11
Descriptive Statistics.....	12
Training Effectiveness .....	12
Discussion.....	14
Conclusions.....	15
Recommendations for Future Research .....	15
Recommendations for Future Practice .....	16
Summary .....	17
References.....	19

## CONTENTS (Continued)

---

	Page
Appendix A Acronyms .....	A-1
Appendix B Army Green Participant Response Form.....	B-1
Appendix C Army Green Rater Scoring Sheet.....	C-1
Appendix D Pre- and Post-Test Mean Item Ratings by Participant .....	D-1

### List of Tables

Table 1. Army Green Themes and Definitions .....	7
Table 2. Army Green Themes by Vignette .....	8
Table 3. Service Time and Mean Composite Ratings by Participant .....	12
Table 4. Pre- and Post-Test Mean Item and Composite Ratings .....	13
Table 5. Length of Service and Performance Rating Correlations .....	14

### List of Figures

Figure 1. Overview of Training Development and Assessment Procedures .....	6
Figure 2. Mean composite rating by participant .....	13

## ARMY GREEN: TRAINING NON-TACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING BY PLATOON LEADERS

### Introduction

The expanding role of small units in the contemporary operating environment has resulted in junior officers facing challenges of unprecedented complexity and responsibility. Through formal education and training these junior officers are prepared to make many difficult tactical decisions under a variety of different conditions. However, it is often the case that new lieutenants (LTs)<sup>1</sup> face difficult non-tactical decisions when they take charge of their first platoon. These non-tactical decisions are rarely if ever addressed through formal education or training.

The goal of this research was to develop a theme-based training program that would address the non-tactical decisions facing young LTs taking charge of their first platoon. The first and primary step was the development of a set of training materials referred to here as Army Green. The training materials include 10 instructional themes, 10 problem-laden vignettes, and participant response and rater forms. The second step was a preliminary training assessment conducted with a group of 12 LTs, whose problem solving performance on several vignettes was rated by a small group of majors (MAJs).

This report is organized as follows. The Background section reviews the reasons for undertaking this research and a training methodology called Think Like a Commander (TLAC). In addition, Adaptive leadership behaviors are also reviewed in conjunction with Army and platoon level values. The Method section describes the procedures for training development and training assessment. Next, the results of the training assessment are presented. Finally, the report concludes with a brief set of recommendations to help refine and implement Army Green training.

### *Background*

Current military forces are required to carry out increasingly complex missions in unstable environments. The situations LTs and captains (CPTs) face are routinely more volatile, ambiguous, and complicated than ever before. To be effectively analyzed and resolved, contemporary environments demand from young officers a level of initiative, leadership, and intellect previously expected of more senior officers. While the decisions made by platoon leaders (PLs) and company commanders (CCs) are traditionally tactical, the intricacy of the environments in which they are made gives them strategic potential. The Army has come to believe in the importance of teaching personnel how to think, not just what to think. What is needed is education and training that teaches officers to think broadly and contextually so their vision of situations and options is wider and deeper (McCausland & Martin, 2001).

The years of tactical instruction received by most officers provides a solid foundation of knowledge to perform successfully on the battlefield. However, today's missions

---

<sup>1</sup> A list of all acronyms used in this report is included in Appendix A

are often stability or peacekeeping, rather than combatant. It is expected that non-warfighting missions will play an ever increasing role in future warfare. The situations posed in this context are rife with stability or non-tactical problems and challenges.

Today's security environment demands more from Army leaders than ever before. Army leaders must not only be able to lead Soldiers but also influence other people. They must be able to work with members of other Services and governmental agencies. They must win the willing cooperation of multinational partners, both military and civilian. But ultimately, the Army demands self-aware and adaptive leaders who can compel enemies to surrender in war and master the circumstances facing them in peace. Victory and success depend on the effectiveness of these leaders' organizations. Developing effective organizations requires hard, realistic, and relevant training (U.S. Department of the Army, 2005).

Within this volatile environment, the PL must also manage the unit in situations other than combat that may interfere with the LT's ability to lead and the platoon's ability to accomplish the mission. These non-tactical concerns often involve internal problems or issues with the platoon sergeant (PSG), Soldiers in the platoon, or the CC. The task of the LT in resolving problems is often non-specific, discretionary, and unstructured. It may include providing counsel, locating appropriate resources, dealing with difficult people, and disciplining subordinates. It is unlikely training and education would have prepared the new LT for the decision making required to quickly and effectively handle many such non-tactical issues.

Traditionally, the LT learns much of what is required to effectively lead a platoon from the PSG. While the PL and the PSG have to be an effective team to lead their troops, the two often have distinct ways of viewing the same situation. Oftentimes, the LT assumes the role of platoon leader without any leadership experience whatsoever. The PSG, on the other hand, may have many years of leading troops. Usually, when a LT takes charge of the platoon, the PSG has been working with the unit for some time and has already developed rapport with the Soldiers. In regard to the hands-on training of the PL, the goal is not to take the PSG out of the equation. To do so would squander the invaluable experience of the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). In shifting focus to adaptive thinking, the advice and counsel of the PSG exists as one source of pertinent information. Rather, Army Green is expected to supplement the training and mentoring opportunities available to new PLs for resolving non-tactical problems.

The following literature review is divided into three broad sections. The first section briefly describes the development of the training technique, TLAC, which has been a valuable tool in developing adaptive thinking in tactical situations for captains of the U.S. Army. The second section provides the rationale for the development of Army Green for training non-tactical skills based on the TLAC methodology. The last section proposes that the usefulness of Army Green is to help develop adaptive, ethical leaders that consider Army and platoon values when making difficult decisions.

### *Adaptive Thinking for Tactical Skills – TLAC*

The term adaptive thinking describes the cognitive behavior that acts as a vehicle for skillful and automatic application of knowledge to novel and unforeseen conditions. Actual combat may be the best method for leaders to learn how to adapt their knowledge to unfamiliar combat situations. However, this is too infrequent to be practical and too risky to be ethical. To address this need, the Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology (ATTM) was developed (Ross, & Lussier, 1999). The objective of ATTM was to make the thinking required on the battlefield habitual through deliberate practice exercises. The repetitive performance occurring in the exercises is intended to create automatic thinking that is characteristic of experts. As more rudimentary elements of expert battle command become ingrained, requiring less mental effort, more complex situations can be considered and manipulated.

A training program called Think like a Commander (TLAC) based on ATTM was developed. TLAC uses deliberate practice to train expert thinking habits used on the battlefield (Lussier, Shadrick, & Prevou, 2003). The program is theme-based in which vignettes are presented accompanied by questions structured to elicit the student's thought processes. The development of themes and vignettes for the Army Green will be explained in the methods section of this report. The TLAC themes are elements of the thinking behaviors typical of tactical experts which the student models in the TLAC exercises. The themes represent key considerations that are applicable across many situations. However, not all of the themes are represented in each vignette.

### *Adaptive Thinking for Non-Tactical Skills – Army Green*

Officers receive numerous years of instruction and perform countless field exercises that are intended to prepare them for combat. At the platoon and company level, the officer is expected to be skilled in these tactical and operational aspects of warfare. In contrast, almost no formal training is provided on the skills needed to handle the wide range of non-combat, referred to here as non-tactical, problems that PLs must repeatedly address and resolve. Too often the skills needed to handle the emergent, non-routine, and dynamic components that characterize a large portion of leadership tend to get neglected. Training on such non-tactical skills is the focus of Army Green. For further discussion of these skills see the Army Pentathlete Program (<http://www.benchworks.army.mil/>).

The role of the Army Green is to develop the cognitive functioning necessary to adaptively resolve the non-tactical situations that confront young officers, especially PLs. The non-tactical issues revolve around how the officer relates to the individual Soldier, maintains morale in the group, accesses information, serves as a role model, and develops subordinates in non-mission related areas. It is unknown how well traditional principles, skills, and training are able to guide PLs through the many non-tactical problems that emerge in the day-to-day dealings with the Soldiers of their platoon. Perhaps officers possess the skills necessary for more routine problems, but are not able to apply them to unfamiliar situations. To that end, it was hypothesized that the ATTM may help officers resolve the wide range of non-tactical problems likely to occur.

## Adaptive Leadership Behaviors

The two broad objectives of leadership behaviors are to successfully perform the group's tasks and to maintain group cohesion. The underlying assumption of these objectives is that the leader is able to influence the values, beliefs, and behaviors of the followers in such a manner that the goals of the organization are realized. The behaviors exhibited by leaders as they carry out strategies to further the organization's objectives will be judged by followers and act to influence their behavior and attitudes. Leadership behaviors and actions will have a more enduring influence if they are perceived to be value-based and ethical by the followers (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996).

Ethics comes from the Greek word for habit, ethos (Toner, 1995). Ethics are the principles, values, and standards that guide everyone as to morally correct behavior. Military leaders are no exception. A training concern is how they develop the habit of routinely performing ethical acts (i.e., habitually doing the right thing). The literature of cognitive psychology provides useful insights into how people learn skills. Underpinning the mastery of any skill is the need for focused, deliberate and sustained practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). Ethical behavior requires character, which is developed by education and sustained by the habitual performance of virtuous acts (Weaver, 1999).

### *Army Values*

The Army values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage are lofty ideals of character and appropriately overarching as guiding values for an organization as a whole. Combined, the seven core values provide a road map to accomplish the overall mission of the Army to fight and win our nation's wars. The mission answers the question: How does our organization intend to succeed? The values answer the question: What behaviors will get us there? The mission and the values must operate in tandem. Weaver (1999) indicates that within the military profession a breach in integrity is always accompanied with a leadership failure. This is probably a fair assessment for any of the Army values.

### *Platoon-Level Values*

In the platoon, values tied to the missions of the platoon are especially important. They support the behaviors necessary to achieve specific goals. Provided that values developed at a given level are in accordance with the Army's core values, these derived values and missions will be more relevant than relying solely on the core values to guide the unit's courses of action (COA). In the development of the adaptive thinking themes for this research, a draft of possible themes was presented to CPTs and NCOs who discussed, debated, and refined the list. It was important that the input of individuals with experience at the platoon level drove the development of the themes. This ensured that the values would be closely tied to the missions typically assigned to PLs.

## *Summary*

When a leader is attempting to solve a problem, a desired end-state is envisioned. The discrepancy between the current state and that end-state creates discomfort. It is tempting to act or behave in a manner that will immediately reduce this discomfort. As most of us have personal values and beliefs that automatically guide our decisions, a worker must also consider an additional set of values, which may or may not match their own. These are the values of the organization. A Soldier in the U.S. Army is well versed on the values of the organization. Army Green hopes to train leaders to better solve non-tactical problems while adhering to the Army and platoon values.

## Method

This research was conducted in response to a technical advisory service (TAS) request from the Commander of the 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment to develop theme-based training for LTs' non-tactical problem solving called Army Green. In support of the request, the 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment provided (a) initial concepts for the vignettes, (b) feedback, information, and direction during vignette development, including subject matter experts (SMEs) that comprised a focus group, and (c) LTs as training participants for an assessment of Army Green. Following is a description of the procedures used to develop and assess the Army Green training program.

## Training Development

An overview of the training development and assessment phases for Army Green is provided in Figure 1. The first phase consisted of developing and refining a set of themes that best captured the non-tactical considerations required of new PLs. It also included developing a set of vignettes that illustrate the types of non-tactical situations that may be faced by LTs. Drafts of the themes were drawn from survey data collected from 120 LTs and 90 CPTs. The wording of the themes relied heavily on the FM 22-100. Drafts of the vignettes were taken from interview responses of CPTs, in which each described a situation they felt ill-prepared to manage during their initial weeks or months as a PL. A five person focus group of SMEs assisted in the refinement and integration of these drafts, yielding 10 themes and 10 vignettes.

The second phase consisted of two steps focused on the training assessment of Army Green. The first step involved conducting a series of training and assessment sessions (two pre-test, six training, and two post-test) with 12 second lieutenants and collecting written responses before and after the training. In the second step, three MAJs evaluated the effectiveness of the training based on the participants written responses.




Figure 1. Overview of training development and assessment procedures.

#### *Theme and Vignette Development*

As specified in the MOA, the training adopted the TLAC methodology to address non-tactical leadership behaviors important to LTs as they take command of their first platoon. While TLAC focuses on tactical problems and skills, Army Green centered on non-tactical problems couched in vignettes which require the LT to apply various non-tactical leadership skills to arrive at a desired outcome. The vignettes illustrate situations that CPTs described during interviews as not addressed by their training in the Armor Officers Basic Course (AOBC). In the present research, 10 themes and 10 vignettes were developed for Army Green. The vignettes, themes, and definitions are provided in the Army Green Training Product located on the inside back cover of this report. The 10 themes and their definitions are also presented in Table 1.

*Initial drafts.* The sources for drafting the themes were surveys and FM 22-100. The 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment supported the distribution and collection of survey instruments to 120

LTs and 90 CPTs. The survey asked the LTs to list, in order of importance, their top five concerns in taking charge of a platoon. The CPTs' survey contained two additional items: (a) prior to your experiences as a PL, what were your major concerns about taking charge of a platoon? and (b) based on your experiences, what should concern a new PL the most? The two items instructed the CPTs to list, in order of importance, their top three concerns. Demographic information collected from both LTs and CPTs included: (a) time in the Army, (b) time as a commissioned officer, (c) source of commission, and (d) experience as a PL.

Table 1

Army Green Themes and Definitions

Theme	Definition
1. Be Proactive	Strive to improve people, facilities, equipment, training, and resources.
2. Be Humble	Be aware of strengths and weaknesses and seek self-improvement.
3. When In Charge, Take Charge	Analyze a situation thoroughly and in a timely manner, determine what is important, and decide what needs to be done.
4. Be Approachable	Exhibit humility, avoid a condescending attitude, and strive to understand individuals based on their own ideas, qualifications, and contributions.
5. Be Confident	Believe in yourself and in your NCOs.
6. Be Consistent	Set expectations (set powerbase early) and reliably maintain standards.
7. Be a Good Communicator	Listen carefully to verbal and non-verbal messages and ensure understanding of your intent.
8. Be a Learner	Capitalize on experiences and heed (recognize the value of) constructive criticism for self-improvement and professional development. Be willing to innovate and adapt.
9. Be a Role Model	Inspire and motivate by performing with personal courage, making ethical choices, and embodying army values and the warrior ethos.
10. Know Your Soldiers	Understand their perspective and know their capabilities (use XO, NCOs, and approach your Soldiers).

Drafts of the vignettes were based on interviews with the 21 CPTs. A typical draft vignette might address helping a Soldier in the platoon who was unable to manage his finances and constantly in trouble for writing bad checks and not paying rent. Arguably, a situation like this may be none of the LT's business. However, it often does become a concern of the Army when the commanding officer is contacted by creditors of the Soldier and the Soldier's personal life is affecting his performance. This is especially true when the Soldier has a family. Personal issues often spill over onto the job. Worrying while on the job or calling in sick because of a personal problem is counterproductive. Contrast this with a Soldier who feels supported by the organization and believes that if the Commanding Officer cannot help personally, he will at least find out who can.

### *Refinement Using a Focus Group*

The draft themes and vignettes were submitted to a focus group of one MAJ, two CPTs, and two first sergeants for refinement and integration. The group met four times for a total of 10 hours. The setting involved the five focus group members and the first two authors around a large table with each session recorded audibly. The group was asked to provide input on the title of the theme, the definition, the theme's relevance to new LTs, and possible additional themes. As a result 10 themes emerged with the focus group SMEs providing the definitions for each as documented in Table 1.

The focus group also reviewed the draft vignettes from the interviews with CPTs. The focus group was asked to ensure the language was consistent with military verbiage and that the situations were realistic and relevant. During review of each vignette, the SMEs determined which of the themes were applicable to the vignette, as documented in Table 2. In addition, they drafted an expert solution for each vignette to aid in training assessment. As can be seen in Table 2, the themes were not counter balanced in terms of the pre and post-test measures, for this initial assessment. However, this is recommended for future research and discussed later in this report.

Table 2

Army Green Themes by Vignette

Theme	Pre-test		Training						Post-test	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Be Proactive		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
2. Be Humble			✓	✓					✓	
3. When In Charge, Take Charge	✓	✓	✓					✓		✓
4. Be Approachable				✓		✓	✓		✓	
5. Be Confident			✓	✓						✓
6. Be Consistent	✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
7. Be a Good Communicator	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
8. Be a Learner	✓		✓		✓				✓	✓
9. Be a Role Model	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓
10. Know Your Soldiers	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	

An example of a final vignette called *Failing APFT* (Army Physical Fitness Test) is presented below.

LT Davis has just taken over as platoon leader when he receives orders of deployment to a combat theater of operations in two months. In reviewing the physical training (PT) records for his platoon, he notices that PFC Freeman failed his last two APFTs. However, there is no record that he was flagged, counseled, or given any special PT program. He is given the test and once again fails due to his inability to run without periodically stopping to walk. He is an otherwise good guy with a strong desire to serve. LT Davis believes that, in a short time, he can motivate him to pass on his own, so for now, gives him a passing score to allow him to deploy. The LT warns PFC Freeman that he will not allow any promotions until he passes the APFT. The unit deploys with PFC Freeman. LT Davis puts him on a remedial PT program for running and goes to great lengths to motivate him to run, but 6 months later, he fails again. Everyone in the platoon is aware of the situation with PFC Freeman. His name appears on the promotion list, along with several others who did pass the APFT, and LT Davis is powerless to stop PFC Freeman from being promoted.

By theme the expert solution for the *Failing APFT* vignette is:

Be a Role Model - The LT failed to balance Army standards with relationship development and safety. There could be a clinical reason the Soldier could not run. His safety and those around him can be at risk if this is not addressed before deployment.

When In Charge, Take Charge - A full medical checkup was warranted.

Be a learner - The LT did not understand his own influence on the promotion system. Once he indicated that the Soldier passed the APFT, the Soldier's promotion status is out of the LT's control.

Know Your Soldiers - Barring a medical condition causing the poor performance, the LT did not know the Soldier well enough to be able to motivate him and did not use his NCOs, such as tasking for development of a remedial PT program.

Be Consistent - The LT did not provide fair and consistent treatment for each of his Soldiers, negatively impacting unit morale. Falsifying the report damaged his own credibility with the unit and up the chain of command also. If he will falsify a report, what else will he do?

Be a Good Communicator - Now the LT must counsel the Soldier indicating that future APFTs will not be falsified and that he has to embark on a program that will enhance his chances of passing. The LT should admit his mistake to the PSG and ask him to help with damage control. The PSG will handle NCOs. The lesson learned is to never compromise standards and commit to upholding standards from now on.

The expert solutions stressed several important points for the APFT vignette. The expert solutions to problems posed in the vignettes rely heavily on what should have been done and what actions are required now. Expert solutions for each vignette are provided along with each vignette on the Army Green Training Product located on the inside back cover of this report.

## Training Assessment

The training assessment phase was conducted over 10 sessions. Each session presented one vignette in which the participants were expected to provide written answers concerning the problem(s) presented and the possible solution(s). After finishing their written answers the participants discussed their COAs for the vignette. The first two sessions served as the pre-test in which the themes were never explicitly introduced by the researchers to facilitate group discussion. The two pre-test vignettes, when combined, presented only 7 of the 10 themes (failing to present; Be Humble, Be Approachable, and Be Confident). The next six sessions served as the training in which the discussion was focused on the themes and how they applied to the possible solutions. The final two sessions served as the post-test. The two post-test vignettes, when combined, covered all 10 themes. Participants' performance was assessed by three independent raters. The raters evaluated the participants' performance on the pre-test and post-test sessions only and they were unaware which responses belonged to which session (pre- vs. post-). Training effectiveness was measured by comparing pre- and post-test ratings.

### *Training*

The training and assessment sessions were conducted over three days in a room that amply accommodated the 12 LTs and the two researchers. The room was arranged so that the tables formed a U-shape with the LTs sitting at the outer edges of the tables and facing each other. As an introduction to the first session, a CPT with the 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment addressed the group giving them background on the research and asking for them to cooperate and participate with due diligence. At that point, the CPT excused himself, leaving only the LTs and the researchers in the room.

Signed informed consent forms and a short demographic questionnaire were collected from each participant. The demographic information sheet possessed a unique number that the participant was asked to remember to place on their written responses for anonymity.

The procedure for all sessions involved each LT reading a vignette and providing a written solution, followed by a group discussion. In their written response, the LTs were asked to describe: (a) the problem in the vignette, (b) the challenge, (c) the COA the LT in the vignette should have taken, and (d) what the best COA is now. The Participant Response Form is available in Appendix B and the Army Green Training Product. After the written responses were completed, the researchers facilitated a group discussion of the vignette. As it became evident that the group was nearing the end of the discussion, the expert solution was presented which often rejuvenated the discussion.

During Vignettes 1 and 2 the discussion was open-ended, that is the themes were not explicitly presented or discussed by the researchers. The themes were introduced between Vignettes 2 and 3. The researchers introduced the themes in terms of their development, definitions, and how they might be applied in resolving situations like those in the vignettes. Written responses followed by group discussions were conducted for Vignettes 3 through 10 just as in Vignettes 1 and 2, with discussion focused heavily on the themes. The last two Vignettes, 9 and 10, served as the post-test to determine the effectiveness of the training. All 10 themes were present across Vignettes 9 and 10. As noted, Table 2 provides an overview of which themes were present in each vignette.

### *Assessment*

Three MAJs from the 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment evaluated the LTs' responses on Vignettes 1, 2, 9, and 10. The raters did not know which vignettes and responses were specified as pre- and post-tests. The raters were given typed copies of responses prepared by the researchers for the four vignettes along with the expert solutions. The responses for each vignette were placed in random order by the researchers. This was done to increase the independence of the raters' evaluation of each response, such that an evaluation was not made in relation to a participant's previous response.

The scoring sheet used by the raters is provided in Appendix D and on the Army Green Training Product. For each participant, the raters answered the same three items for each of the four vignettes. The items were evaluated using a 7-point Likert-type scale, with higher scores indicating better performance. Item 1, Analysis of the Situation, asked the rater to evaluate the critical thinking shown in the response. Item 2, Quality of Solution, addressed the thoroughness of the response and its potential as a preventative measure. Item 3, Leadership Behavior, evaluated the participant's ability to use applicable themes in the development of the solution. The average of the three items served as a composite measure referred to as Adaptive Thinking.

While three MAJs served as raters, the evaluations of one rater was markedly inconsistent with the other two raters and, therefore, not used for the results reported below. This inconsistency is probably due to inadequately standardized rater training procedures as discussed later in the paper. Therefore, the results reported below are based only on the two raters who demonstrated significant inter-rater reliability.

### **Results**

The results focus on a three-day training assessment of Army Green in which 12 LTs participated. The design was a within subjects design based on participants' responses to pre- and post-test vignettes.

### *Reliability Analyses*

Coefficient alpha was used to assess the internal consistency of the three questions used to obtain and evaluate participant responses. The ratings of the 12 LTs on the pre- and post-tests resulted in a coefficient alpha of .86 indicating that the three items comprising the pre and post evaluations are strongly associated with one another. Therefore, the three dependent variables (Analysis of Situation, Quality of Solution, and Leadership Behaviors) used to evaluate the LTs performance are all significantly related to a common construct referred to here as Adaptive Thinking.

To examine interrater reliability, Spearman's rho correlation for each possible bivariate correlation of the three raters was computed. Spearman's rho was chosen because it is a nonparametric statistic and with only three raters a normal distribution could not be assumed. To calculate the correlations, the average score of each participant by rater was used. Rater 1 and 2, while not highly correlated, were significantly related ( $\rho = .35, p < .01$ ). Results indicated that evaluations of Rater 3 were not significantly correlated with either Rater 1 ( $\rho = .18, p = .11$ ) or

Rater 2 ( $\rho = .110$ ,  $p = .23$ ). For this reason, evaluations made by Rater 3 were not included in further analyses.

### *Descriptive Statistics*

A sample of 12 male LTs participated in this research. All participants were commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC). Length of service in the Army ranged from six months to 10 years ( $M = 51.32$  months). The amount of time served as an officer ranged from six to 47 months ( $M = 14$  months). Table 3 shows the comparison of the Adaptive Thinking measure and service information on each participant. A graphical comparison of pre- and post-test scores on the composite score (Adaptive Thinking) by participant is presented in Figure 2. Similar graphs of the three dependent variables are provided in Appendix C.

### *Training Effectiveness*

To examine the effectiveness of the training a series of paired samples  $t$ -tests comparing pre-test and post-test average ratings, for each of the three dependent variables and the composite average, were performed. The pre and post-test means of each item and the composite average are presented in Table 4. Overall, the mean composite score referred to as Adaptive Thinking increased from pre-test ( $n = 12$ ,  $M = 3.02$ ,  $SD = .54$ ,  $SE = .15$ ) to post-test ( $n = 12$ ,  $M = 3.55$ ,  $SD = .65$ ,  $SE = .19$ ). This difference was significant ( $t(11) = -2.82$ ,  $p = .017$ ). Results, for the Leadership Behaviors dependent variable also indicated an increase from pre-test ( $n = 12$ ,  $M = 3.13$ ,  $SD = .68$ ,  $SE = .20$ ) to post-test ( $n = 12$ ,  $M = 3.71$ ,  $SD = .71$ ,  $SE = .21$ ). This difference was also significant ( $t(11) = -2.503$ ,  $p = .029$ ). However, the increases from pre-test to post-test for the other two dependent variables, Analysis of Situation and Quality of Solution, were not significant.

Table 3

Service Time and Mean Composite Ratings by Participant

Participant	Months in Army	Months as an Officer	Pre-test Composite	Post-test Composite	% Change
1	86	8	2.75	3.25	18.18
2	8	8	2.92	3.33	14.04
3	47	9	2.83	3.00	6.01
4	77	9	3.08	4.00	29.87
5	7	7	2.75	2.58	-6.18
6	72	9	3.92	3.50	-10.71
7	120	6	3.17	4.92	56.15
8	6	6	3.17	3.00	-5.36
9	85	47	3.17	4.25	34.07
10	78	11	3.25	3.83	17.85
11	11	11	3.56	3.92	10.11
12	55	47	1.67	3.00	79.64




Figure 2. Mean composite rating by participant.

Table 4

Pre- and Post-Test Mean Item and Composite Ratings

Variable	Pre-test	Post-test	% Change
Item 1 – Analysis of Situation	3.15	3.52	11.7
Item 2 – Quality of Solution	2.82	3.42	21.3
Item 3 – Leadership Behaviors	3.13	3.71	18.5*
Composite – Adaptive Thinking	3.02	3.55	17.5*

\* $p < .05$

*Length of Service.* Results on length of service and performance ratings are summarized in Table 5. Length of service as an officer had little relation to how well the LTs performed on the pre- or post-test. However the range of service as an officer was quite restricted for 10 of the 12 participants (see Table 3). Total length of service in the Army was also not related to pre-test ratings, but was significantly related to post-test performance. These findings suggest that service time per se may not prepare Soldiers for non-tactical problem solving, but it may make Soldiers more responsive to training.

Table 5

## Length of Service and Performance Ratings Correlations

Variable	Total Service Time		Officer Service Time	
	Pre-test	Post-test	Pre-test	Post-test
Item 1 – Analysis of Situation	.09	.30*	.02	.05
Item 2 – Quality of Solution	-.08	.39**	-.18	.03
Item 3 – Leadership Behaviors	.12	.36**	-.26	.01
Composite- Adaptive Thinking	.05	.40**	-.15	.04

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

## Discussion

The LT brings his values and the Army's values to the role of PL. A few may know how these values coexist and how to apply them to any situation they confront. However, the purpose of the research reported here is to ready all junior officers with the ability to successfully adapt to non-tactical situations that require value-based judgments. A set of themes were developed as important considerations a LT may need to successfully address non-tactical issues that arise within the platoon. The themes serve as the foundation on which the officer can grow as a PL and beyond. Based on the interviews with CPTs who have led a platoon, the themes are considerations that successful officers will learn to apply with experience. However, much of this learning may only come from trial-and-error or the tutelage of the PSG and CC, as available.

The findings indicate that non-tactical problem solving requires more than the PL's ability to relate to his troops. As CPTs described the problems they encountered when they were newly assigned to their platoon, it became evident that there was much more involved in handling these unanticipated problems than their ability to relate to others. The issue became not whether or not the LTs can personally handle every single issue that arises in the platoon, but do they know how to find and use the resources at their disposal to help remedy the situation. Resources include the chaplain, the judge advocate general (JAG), the CC, the PSG, and peers. A question that the facilitators raised during the interviews with the CPTs was: How did they, as former PLs, know when additional resources were needed to successfully resolve the problem? The CPTs' answers to this question were varied and uncertain. For example, some said that they tried to handle the problem themselves without success and only then sought help. Others reported that when in unfamiliar territory they immediately began to seek assistance.

Notably, time in service was related to post-test, but not pre-test ratings. Those with more military experience produced better solutions only after the training. Perhaps, the relevance of situations in the vignettes was more salient for Soldiers with more experience in a platoon. During the training discussions, participants with less experience occasionally expressed their disbelief that such events might actually occur. Those with more military experience assured them that situations like these do indeed happen. For instance, in Vignette #9, *Substance Abuse*, many participants found implausible the story in which the Soldier actually purchased drugs from a local in a foreign country where the United States was embroiled in combat. Aside from the illegality of the drug purchase, it was obvious to most participants that a local may object to the U.S. presence and intentionally harm a U.S. Soldier. More experienced participants were not moved by the sensationalism of the story, indicating that they have seen in

their own units what a substance addiction can lead a person to do. Firsthand experience with situations such as those presented in the vignettes may have made them more responsive to the training.

## Conclusions

The primary focus of the current research was to develop, versus assess, materials and methods for training the non-tactical skills of LTs assuming their first platoon command. This section provides a brief set of recommendations on future research and practice to help refine and implement Army Green training.

### *Recommendations for Future Research*

The user-based nature of Army Green is a key strength. Over 230 U.S. Army CPTs and LTs identified a set of values, problems, and situations they deemed relevant to a wide range of non-tactical issues that typically confront PLs. The resulting 10 themes and 10 vignettes from this initial Army Green effort provide a solid base for future research and refinement.

Clearly, the set of vignettes developed are not a complete depiction of the non-tactical problems a new LT may face. Additional problems and situations would emerge from interviews with different Soldiers, including senior and junior officers with even more current experience in ever-changing contemporary operating environments. Other potential sources for Army Green refinement are the resources often called upon when problems occur within a platoon, including JAG, Family Readiness Groups, Army Community Service, and Army Emergency Relief.

Future research should determine more precisely the themes and values needed to successfully resolve non-tactical problems. The results reported here indicate that a few hours of theme-based discussion for problematic vignettes improved LTs' responses to subsequent non-tactical problems. However, future research might assess the degree to which value-based decision making is amenable to training. In contrast to the value-based themes of Army Green, TLAC training stresses information-based themes such as maintain the big picture and think like an enemy. Research on TLAC has demonstrated the powerful effects of training information-based themes in tactical situations (Shadrick & Lussier, 2004).

At least some value-based themes may be less susceptible to training. For example, unreported results from the current Army Green assessment suggest that participants' responses were not affected by training on the themes of Be Humble and Be Approachable. During training development, however, CPTs and NCOs frequently stressed how important it is that leaders not be arrogant or condescending. Is being humble less susceptible to training than other Army Green themes? Does humility suggest weakness to young officers, rather than strength of character? Future research might investigate the relationship between individual themes and training effects as well as ways of improving the training to overcome shortcomings identified.

Future research could readily improve upon the methods and procedures used here for a preliminary assessment of Army Green. Fairly obvious recommendations include the need for training research based on a larger and more representative sample of LT participants. Related expansions might compare the responses of different LTs before and after assuming the PL

position, compare the performance of LTs versus more senior officers such as CPTs, or assess the perceived usefulness of Army Green training by LTs as they complete their PL duty assignment.

Other basic recommendations include the need for more structured procedures and protocols for Army Green training and assessment. For training, more standardized methods should be developed that introduce the themes to a training audience and reinforce the use of themes during vignette discussion. For training assessment, recommendations include more standardized instructions for raters to increase inter-rater reliability and research designs that counterbalance the assignment of vignettes to training and testing. Future research might compare subjective ratings versus objective scoring, such as the multiple-choice formats currently being used for an on-line version of Army Green. The Army Green vignettes can currently be accessed via the Leadership Development Case Studies website (<http://benchworks.army.mil/Case%20Studies/home.htm>) or the Army Benchworks site (<http://www.benchworks.army.mil/>) with Army Knowledge Online access.

#### *Recommendations for Future Practice*

The Army Green product was developed as a training tool for LTs prior to taking their first platoon. The research requirement assumed that most of a LT's formal preparation is focused on problem solving in tactical situations. Army Green was developed, therefore, to foster adaptive problem solving for the many and varied problems faced by junior officers, particularly PLs, in non-tactical situations. The recommendations for future research presented above focused on refinements to Army Green for PL training.

Recommendations for future practice focus mainly on exploring the potential benefits of extending Army Green training beyond peer-based discussion among PLs. Notably, the dilemmas posed in a number of the Army Green vignettes center on the differing values and decisions of a PL and PSG facing the same non-tactical situation. Mutual discussion of the Army Green themes and vignettes may help a PL and PSG align their values and decisions in dealing with their unit's non-tactical problems. Involving their CC in this process may also prove beneficial and resolve some questions that only the CC has the knowledge or authority to answer.

Another recommendation is to examine the use of Army Green with the entire platoon. A platoon-based discussion of the Army Green themes and vignettes may provide a more comprehensive 360-degree perspective on problematic situations as well as a boost to unit cohesion and morale. More participants also raise the possibility for vested role playing, versus mere discussion, of Army Green themes and values. Role playing is often an effective way to open communications, build team cooperation, and develop problem solving skills.

A closing recommendation to adapt Army Green for web-based delivery is already being carried out. The Army Leadership Development website provides a version of Army Green adapted for instructorless training via the internet. The vignettes are presented in the same sequence as the assessment phase of this study. The user reads a written version of each vignette and can then select one of four different COAs. After selecting a COA, the user receives an immediate assessment of their choice. They are then allowed to return to and select other COAs or continue on to senior leader coaching. The senior leader coaching page explores the themes

present in each vignette and provides the expert solution. This format of web-based instruction is currently available at the Army Leadership Development website (<http://benchworks.army.mil/Case%20Studies/home.htm>).

The Army Benchworks on-line version initially presents the Army Green themes and definitions along with a brief introduction to the training. After reading a written version of an Army Green vignette, the participant then rates the four COAs listed on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 representing 'Never' or 'Strongly Disagree' and 7 representing 'Always' or 'Strongly Agree'). After rating the COAs, the trainee receives immediate feedback which is generally positive and informative. The participant can continue to read and respond to additional vignettes, or continue on to Senior Leader Coaching sessions. This format of web-based instruction is currently available at the Army Benchworks homepage by selecting the Virtual Leader option (<http://www.benchworks.army.mil/>).

### *Summary*

The results from Army Green training development and training assessment are promising, although preliminary. The primary goal of the current research was to develop materials and methods for training non-tactical skills with a focus on young LTs assuming their first platoon command. The themes and vignettes developed for Army Green appear relevant to many of the challenging non-tactical issues that typically confront PLs. The user-based nature of these materials attests to their validity thanks to the inputs of 231 U.S. Army CPTs and LTs from the 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment who directly contributed to Army Green development.

The results also underscore the training requirement identified by the leadership of the 16<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment which inspired Army Green. In particular, the survey and interview data from CPTs articulated many of the serious concerns and situations they experienced as former PLs dealing with the non-tactical problems of their platoon. The need for Army Green is also reinforced by the interesting, but preliminary, finding that service time had no effect on participants' pre-test responses to problematic vignettes. Based on post-test ratings of performance, however, time in service appears to make leaders more responsive to theme-based training that deals with resolving non-tactical problems.

The report provides a brief set of recommendations to help refine and implement Army Green training. Future research recommendations stress the need to revise and expand Army Green vignettes and problems based on other Soldiers' experience in ever-changing contemporary operating environments, as well as on other resources critical to resolving non-tactical problems such as JAG, Family Readiness Groups, Army Community Service, and Army Emergency Relief.

Future practice recommendations focus on the potential benefits of extending Army Green training beyond peer-based discussion among PLs. Recommendations include using Army Green themes and vignettes for mutual discussion among key leaders including a PL, PSG, and their CC. Platoon-level extensions might include unit-wide discussions or more vested role playing of the Army Green vignettes. Distance learning recommendations are supported by an Army Leadership Development website that provides an instructorless version of Army Green on the internet.

## References

Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. & Tesch-Romer, C. (1993). The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance, *Psychological Review*, 100, pp. 363-406.

Kanungo, R. N., & Mendonca, M. (1996). *Ethical dimensions of leadership*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Lussier, J. W., Shadrick, S. B., & Prevou, M. I. (2003). *Think Like a Commander Prototype: Instructor's guide to adaptive thinking* (Research Product 2003-02). Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

McCausland, J. D., & Martin, G. F. (2001). Transforming strategic leader education for the 21st-century army. *Parameters*, 31, 17-33.

Ross, K. G., & Lussier, J. W. (1999). A Training Solution for Adaptive Battlefield Performance. *Proceedings of the 1999 Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference*, Orlando, FL.

Shadrick, S. B., & Lussier, J. W. (2004). *Assessment of the Think Like a Commander training program* (ARI Research Report 1824). Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Toner, J. H. (1995). *True faith and allegiance: The burden of military ethics*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

U.S. Army Knowledge Online. (2006). The Army Benchworks: Virtual Leader. Available online: <http://www.benchworks.army.mil/>.

U.S. Department of the Army (1998). *Army Leadership* (Field Manual FM 22-100). Washington, DC: Department of the Army.

U.S. Department of the Army (June, 2005). *The Army* (Field Manual FM 1). Washington, DC: Department of the Army.

Weaver, F. B. (1999). *General Creighton Abrams: Ethical leadership at the strategic level*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

## Appendix A

### Acronyms

AOBC	Armor Officers Basic Course
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
ATTM	Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology
CC	Company Commander
COA	Course of Action
CPT	Captain
FM	Field Manual
JAG	Judge Advocate General
LT	Lieutenant
MAJ	Major
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
PL	Platoon Leader
PSG	Platoon Sergeant
PT	Physical Training
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Course
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TLAC	Think Like a Commander
TAS	Technical Advisory Service

## Army Green Participant Response Form

Substance Abuse

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Wright receives his first PLT just as he is arriving in the theater of operations. The outgoing PL briefs LT Wright on the status of the PLT, providing information on the personal and professional standings of each Soldier. In particular, he warns LT Wright about the ongoing drug and alcohol abuse of SPC Harper. He tells the LT that due to "technicalities," SPC Harper has avoided any processes of separation. Combat is eminent, and the unit is short-handed. The CO asked the LT to decide whether to keep SPC Harper or to send him home. He reasons that SPC Harper is an adequate Soldier and can be controlled in the isolated environment. During several weeks of tactical combat operations, SPC Harper performs exceptionally well, playing a key role in the maneuvers. Thinking that the problem had resolved itself in those weeks, the LT pushes the concern to the back of his mind.

As soon as combat ceases, he and two other Soldiers begin buying an unknown drug from locals while guarding a checkpoint. The situation comes to light after one of the other Soldiers begins hallucinating while in the guard tower.

Be proactive  
Be humble  
When in charge, take charge  
Be approachable  
Be confident  
Be consistent  
Be a good communicator  
Be a learner  
Be a role model  
Know your Soldiers

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

## Appendix C

### Army Green Rater Scoring Sheet

Instructions to Evaluator: Please read the LT leader themes and their definitions. These themes have been developed by the 16<sup>th</sup> CAV Regiment and the U.S. Army Research Institute based on leader doctrine and current practice, and has been targeted for training to prepare new LTs for taking charge of a platoon. If you have any questions or need any clarification of those themes, do not hesitate to ask the ARI POC - Robin Hinkle at 4-2613 or by emailing [Robin.K.Hinkle@knox.army.mil](mailto:Robin.K.Hinkle@knox.army.mil). After a clear understanding of the themes, please read the vignette and expert solutions. Finally rate each participant's response to the vignette by answering the three questions below.

If you have any questions, please ask before you begin. Thank you in advance for your time and expertise on this effort.

1. Please rate the **analysis of this situation** by circling the appropriate rating below. The rating scale is developed such that a "1" represents a lack of critical thinking about what the given situation involves, a "4" represents a quick assessment of basic considerations, and a "7" would represent a thorough consideration of all issues involved in the immediate situation and follow-on implications.

1.....	2.....	3.....	4.....	5.....	6.....	7
Weak		Basic		Strong	Analysis	
Analysis		Considerations			of Situation	
of Situation		Covered				

2. Please rate the **solution** that was developed for the given situation by circling the appropriate rating below. A "1" on the rating scale would indicate a poor solution, a "4" rating would indicate a good solution that addresses the most pressing issues involved, and a rating of "7" represents a complete and thorough solution to the immediate and follow-on problems and even preventive measures to ensure no further difficulties.

1.....	2.....	3.....	4.....	5.....	6.....	7
Poor		Fair		Strong		
Solution		Solution		Solution		

*Continues*


3. Please rate the **extent of leadership exemplified** in the analysis, solution development, and discussion of the leader challenge in this participant's response. A rating of "1" indicates no consideration of leader themes, a rating of "4" indicates incomplete application of some leader themes, and a "7" on the rating scale indicates that the participant applied all appropriate leader themes. For example, a "7" indicates highly proactive, high confidence, taking charge, being highly approachable, highly confident, highly consistent and etc. as necessary for a given situation.

1.....	2.....	3.....	4.....	5.....	6.....	7
Lack of Leadership is evident		Some Leadership evident		Strong Leadership is evident		


## Appendix D

### Pre- and Post-Test Rating Mean Item Ratings by Participant


#### Analysis of Situation (Item 1)



#### Quality of Solution (Item 2)



### Leadership Behavior (Item 3)



## **Table of Contents**


# **Army Green Training Product**

- **Overview of Training Development and Assessment Procedures**
- **Themes and Definitions**
- **Theme by Vignette**
- **Vignettes, Themes, and Expert Solutions**
- **Participant Response Form**
- **Rater Scoring Sheet**

\* Companion Research Report to this Training Product is:

Hinkle, R. K., Karrasch, A. I., & Burke, T. J. (In Preparation). Army Green: Training Non-Tactical Problem Solving by Platoon Leaders. (ARI Research Report). Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science

## Overview of Training Development and Assessment Procedures:



## **Themes and Definitions:**

### **Army Green Training Product**

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Definition</b>
1. Be Proactive	Strive to improve people, facilities, equipment, training, and resources.
2. Be Humble	Be aware of strengths and weaknesses and seek self-improvement.
3. When In Charge, Take Charge	Analyze a situation thoroughly and in a timely manner, determine what is important, and decide what needs to be done.
4. Be Approachable	Exhibit humility, avoid a condescending attitude, and strive to understand individuals based on their own ideas, qualifications, and contributions.
5. Be Confident	Believe in yourself and in your NCO's.
6. Be Consistent	Set expectations (set powerbase early) and reliably maintain standards.
7. Be a Good Communicator	Listen carefully to verbal and non-verbal messages and ensure understanding of your intent.
8. Be a Learner	Capitalize on experiences and heed (recognize the value of) constructive criticism for self-improvement and professional development. Be willing to innovate and adapt.
9. Be a Role Model	Inspire and motivate by performing with personal courage, making ethical choices, and embodying army values and the warrior ethos.
10. Know Your Soldiers	Understand their perspective and know their capabilities (use XO, NCO's, and approach your Soldiers).

## Themes by Vignette:

### Army Green Training Product

Theme	Vignette									
	Pre-Test		Training						Post-Test	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Be Proactive		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
2. Be Humble			✓	✓					✓	
3. When In Charge, Take Charge	✓	✓	✓					✓		✓
4. Be Approachable				✓		✓	✓		✓	
5. Be Confident			✓	✓						✓
6. Be Consistent	✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
7. Be a Good Communicator	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
8. Be a Learner	✓		✓		✓				✓	✓
9. Be a Role Model	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓
10. Know Your Soldiers	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	

## **Vignettes, Themes, and Expert Solutions:**

**Army Green Training Product**

### Vignette # 1: Failing APFT

LT Davis had just taken over as PL when he receives orders of deployment to a combat theater of operations in two months. In reviewing the PT records for his platoon, he notices that PFC Freeman failed his last two APFTs. However, there is no record that he was flagged, counseled, or given any special PT program. He is given the test and once again fails due to his inability to run without periodically stopping to walk. He is an otherwise good guy with a strong desire to serve. LT Davis believes that, in a short time, he can motivate him to pass on his own, so, for now, gives him a passing score to allow him to deploy. The LT warns PFC Freeman that he will not allow any promotions until he passes the APFT. The unit deploys with PFC Freeman. LT Davis puts him on a remedial PT program for running and goes to great lengths to motivate him to run, but 6 months later, he fails again.

Everyone in the platoon is aware of the situation with PFC Freeman. His name appears on the promotion list, along with several others who did pass the APFT, and LT Davis is powerless to stop PFC Freeman from being promoted.

#### Themes for Vignette # 1: Failing APFT

- 3. When in charge, take charge
- 6. Be consistent
- 7. Be a good communicator
- 8. Be a learner
- 9. Be a role model
- 10. Know your Soldiers

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 1: Failing APFT

The LT failed to balance Army standards with relationship development and safety. There could be a clinical reason the Soldier could not run. His safety and those around him can be at risk if this is not addressed before deployment. A full medical checkup was warranted. The LT did not understand his own influence on the promotion system. Once he indicated that the Soldier passed the APFT, the Soldier's promotion status is out of the LT's control. Barring a medical condition causing the poor performance, the LT did not know the Soldier well enough to be able to motivate him and did not use his NCOs, such as tasking for development of a remedial PT program.

The LT did not provide fair and consistent treatment for each of his Soldiers, negatively impacting unit morale. Falsifying the report damaged his own credibility with unit and up chain of command also (if he will falsify report, what else will he do?). Now, the LT must counsel the Soldier indicating that future APFTs will not be falsified and that he has to embark on a program that will enhance his chances of passing. The LT should admit his mistake to the PSG and ask him to help with damage control. PSG will handle NCO's. The lesson learned is to never compromise standards and commit to upholding standards from now on.

## Vignette # 2: Lost Equipment

It is the first month of LT Sharp's assignment as Platoon Leader. He is still getting to know his troops and the unit is deployed to NTC. During an equipment inspection, he notices that equipment is being double-counted. Once the inspector, an SFC, moves on and starts inventorying the next vehicle, the PSG tells a Private to remove a MILES cable that had already been accounted for and to place it in his tank. As the SFC continues on with the inspector, LT Sharp approaches the Private and tells him to return the cable. The Private indicates that he is following the SFC's instructions and the LT tells him that he will speak to the SFC and not to worry about it. Later, the SFC questions the Private concerning the cable. The Private tells him that the LT ordered him to return the cable.

LT Sharp waits until the next day to talk with the SFC. The SFC becomes visibly upset and defends his actions by insisting he did nothing wrong. He says he was only trying to protect a Soldier who lost a cable and would have to pay for it out of his own pocket.

### Themes for Vignette # 2: Lost Equipment

1. Be proactive
3. When in charge, take charge
7. Be a good communicator
9. Be a role model

### Expert Solution for Vignette # 2: Lost Equipment

Initial counseling with PSG would have set expectations and powerbase of the LT. This will indicate to the PSG how the LT would have wanted that situation handled. The situation cannot be ignored, but there is a need to develop a good relationship with the PSG and still uphold Army values. A part of this is to be a good steward by maintaining an accounting of equipment. The LT should not call attention to this situation by questioning the PSG publicly. Soldiers need to believe in the NCO's and the tasks they assign. Approaching the private directly undermines the PSG's authority and is detrimental to the LT's relationship with him. The LT should approach the PSG immediately and privately. The LT must be proactive about lost equipment by dealing with administrative procedures to account for lost equipment and determining if the Soldier is responsible. Pre-inspection of equipment by the LT will ensure there are no surprises during the actual inspections. Issues of equipment inventory should be addressed in quarterly counseling with his PSG.

### Vignette # 3: Role Reversal

LT Adams' assignment was to take over as PL for a platoon, of which the former PL was relieved of duty. The PSG has been performing the duties of PL, before the former PL's removal and in the interim. Prior to arriving, LT Adams was excited and felt prepared to take the leadership position. However, he had some apprehension about his PSG, 37 year-old SFC Bandy, with 17 years of service. When he told classmates about his upcoming assignment, some made comments about SFC being highly competent both technically and tactically, but also condescending and demoralizing to his Soldiers. Upon arrival, LT Adams scheduled a meeting with SFC Bandy to take place immediately.

During this initial meeting, LT Adams' uneasiness about working with SFC Bandy was confirmed. SFC Bandy did most of the talking, telling LT Adams how things had been done in the past, and what to expect in the future. Soon, it became apparent that SFC Bandy intended to continue performing the PL responsibilities. LT Adams noticed that in the motor pool, the duties customarily assigned to the PSG were not being done. Reasoning that the work needed to be done regardless, LT Adams began performing those tasks.

During the first mission, LT Adams let SFC Bandy take charge and the results were dismal. Prior to the second mission, LT Adams tells SFC Bandy that he is ready to take over and gives orders. SFC Bandy agrees with the orders saying it's the right course of action and then gets on the net commandeering the platoon and begins contradicting orders. They are in the field for 3 months. Outside of tactical maneuvers, the roles and responsibilities of PL and PSG appear to be appropriately assumed and executed. However, SFC Bandy continues to countermand LT Adams' orders during maneuvers. During the last mission of this 3 month period, SFC Bandy disobeys an order resulting in LT Adams' tank being destroyed. While on the net, LT Adams' loses all composure and an argument ensues. They return from the field that week. A few days later, LT Adams goes to the motor pool, but cannot find SFC Bandy. LT Adams calls for SFC Bandy to come to the motor pool. SFC Bandy is furious when he arrives and begins yelling at LT Adams.

#### Themes for Vignette # 3: Role Reversal

2. Be humble
3. When in charge, take charge
5. Be confident
6. Be consistent
8. Be a learner
9. Be a role model
10. Know your Soldiers

### Expert Solution for Vignette # 3: Role Reversal

The first thing the LT should have done upon taking his PLT was to establish his powerbase without appearing arrogant. When the LT noticed that his PSG was usurping his authority, he should have discussed his concerns with him, but remain firm in his ability to lead the platoon. It is important to develop a good relationship with the PSG, but it must be balanced with maintaining credibility with the platoon.

During the training mission incident and the events that followed, the LT should have maintained his composure and refrained from arguing in the presence of other Soldiers, by speaking to the PSG in private. The LT must reestablish powerbase and reassert authority as PL immediately, in the presence of everyone. If he cannot regain control, he needs to consult with his CO.

#### Vignette # 4: Coping with Distance

LT Bryant and his PSG have had several counseling sessions with 21 year-old PFC Cruz about his family obligations encroaching on his professional duties. During counseling, PFC Cruz says that his wife does not have a driver's license and is totally dependent upon him for any activities requiring her to leave their home, such as going to the store or taking one of their three children to doctor's appointment. To no avail, LT Bryant and his PSG have advised PFC Cruz to get his wife a driver's license, providing him with phone numbers of on-post services that can assist them and escorting him to Family Readiness Groups. LT Bryant asked PFC Cruz if he will bring his wife in so they can all discuss possible solutions. In the counseling session, PFC Cruz voiced agreement that changes must be made, but his wife openly and adamantly refused to make any lifestyle changes.

Several months later, LT Bryant arrives at JRTC with his PLT for mission rehearsal exercises in preparation for deployment to a combat theater of operations. In a few weeks, the unit will be deploying for at least a year. The PSG tells LT Bryant that he just discovered that Mrs. Cruz is 7 months pregnant and PFC Cruz will be in the field when the child is due. Up to this point, PFC Cruz has not mentioned the pregnancy. Within two days, his wife is calling him to come back home to take her to the grocery store and to doctor's appointments. You discover from PFC Cruz that, other than an initial visit, she has not gone to any of her appointments.

#### Themes for Vignette # 4: Coping with Distance

1. Be proactive
2. Be humble
4. Be approachable
5. Be confident
7. Be a good communicator
10. Know your Soldiers

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 4: Coping with Distance

Leaders should "know their Soldiers," including their family needs. This requires the LT to keep the lines of communication open and be approachable so he is aware of the situation at the earliest possible stage. Counseling should involve communication that is characterized by active listening and consideration of potential cultural, religious, and language barriers. Attempt to create a family action plan that works for Soldiers' family.

Communicating up the chain, to the CO, and down, with Cruz directly and with NCOs will help the LT develop a COA that balances the Soldier's need to take care of the family with the needs of the organization. Counsel PFC on options (e.g., family readiness groups, move on post, move to mom's, place on list of high risk families for rear detachment). Any COA must begin immediately and be tracked for effectiveness. Dedicate an NCO to Cruz to immediately/proactively implement action plan. Use all

assets available (chaplain, 1SG, SGM, ACS). Finally, clarify that if PFC and Mrs. Cruz do not cooperate, the Army cannot absorb this. Paperwork for chartering him out will begin. The LT needs to realize when every avenue has been exhausted.

### Vignette # 5: Transporting Tanks

LT Riddle has been a PL in Korea for 5 months. The CO tasked LT Riddle to send seven tanks to Seoul to be painted. Tanks in the battalion had not been sent by rail for seven years. There was no one to ask how this was done, when it should be done, or how to coordinate the logistics. After much research, LT Riddle finally found someone, a civilian working on post at the division transportation office, who agreed to help with the transport. Two challenges that arose during preparation for transport were the vast amount of paperwork required and obtaining the necessary equipment to secure the tanks on the railcar. The request forms were unfamiliar to the LT and the CO could provide very little advice on how to complete them. The task was arduous, but the LT completed them, filed them, and the transport was authorized. The civilian contractor did not have the shackles needed to tie down the tanks. The LT realized that the shackles needed were the same as those on the HEMTT Fueler. Through an extensive amount of coordination, LT Riddle secured usage of the shackles. The last task was to unload the tanks and inventory the equipment. The PSG was given this task with a deadline of the day before the transport. When the LT asked about the status, the PSG assured him that this was complete and the tanks were ready to go. The tanks were loaded on the railcar, secured, inspected, and sent on their way.

The following evening, the CO knocks on the LT's door saying that he thinks there is a problem. The painter had called the CO indicating that a machine gun was in one of the tanks.

#### Themes for Vignette # 5: Transporting Tanks

1. Be proactive
6. Be consistent
7. Be a good communicator
8. Be a learner
10. Know your Soldiers

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 5: Transporting Tanks

The LT failed to recognize that delegation does not relieve him of responsibility. The LT will always be held accountable and must complete final inspection. The LT must understand the need to balance the risk associated with delegation and the trust required to forge a positive relationship with his platoon. Once the LT becomes familiar with the capabilities of his subordinates, he will be able to delegate without micromanaging. Communicating the intent of the task can clear up ambiguities that may arise during execution by providing information that will assist the subordinate in making relevant decisions. In this case, the LT may have told his PSG of the importance of inspecting each tank, not just doing a spot check, which is probably what happened here. He will learn how thoroughly each of his Soldiers performs a task and whom he can trust with each task. The LT needs to realize that his PSG may delegate the task down himself. This makes it all the more important that the LT always close the loop with a final

inspection, even when he becomes familiar with his platoon. He may not know who is actually performing the task he assigned to someone else. By doing this, the LT can ensure that standards are maintained consistently regardless of who ultimately executed the task. After this incident, the LT can use the situation to gain respect from PSG by maintaining personal accountability (not pointing finger at PSG) and taking responsibility for the incident.

### Vignette # 6: Troops Arrested in Korean Village

LT Crowley is 23 years old, serving his first assignment as PL in Korea. He receives a call in the middle of the night regarding one of his Soldiers, 31 year-old SGT Smith. Previously, SGT Smith has exhibited exemplar behavior and has a good reputation. He appears to be a responsible Soldier and performs well within his unit. His wife resides in New Jersey and is expecting their first child. LT Crowley's only concern about SGT Smith has been his friendship with a Soldier from another platoon, SPC Jones, whom he knows to be a good Soldier in the field, but has displayed a drinking problem and some behavioral issues in garrison.

Earlier on this particular night, LT Crowley had bumped into SGT Smith, who asked the LT to have a drink with him and SPC Jones. LT Crowley told him he was meeting friends later, but had time for a beer or two. Some time after the LT left, SGT Smith and SPC Jones decided to go shopping and found themselves in a discussion with a shop owner over the price of an item. The discussion became heated when SPC Jones somehow offended the salesman and a physical altercation ensued. SPC Jones fell through the window of the shop and both Soldiers were arrested and charged with public intoxication and assault in Korean Federal Court. SGT Smith had nothing to do with the altercation but was still charged, albeit with a lesser charge than SPC Jones. The shop owner also claimed that the Soldiers were trying to shoplift from his store.

LT Crowley and SGT Smith meet with lawyers from JAG to discuss SGT Smith's situation. The U.S. has an agreement with Korea in which Soldiers convicted by Korean Federal Courts will stay in Korea until the sentence is complete. The likely sentence will be three years and LT Crowley feels certain that both Soldiers will be convicted if tried. The JAG suggests that SGT Smith consider an in-court settlement agreement that would require a) admission of guilt and b) \$700 in reparations. SGT Smith adamantly claims his innocence and is reluctant to pay reparations.

#### Themes for Vignette # 6: Troops Arrested in Korean Village

1. Be proactive
4. Be approachable
7. Be a good communicator
9. Be a role model

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 6: Troops Arrested in Korean Village

Drinking with his Soldiers prior to this incident compromises his ability to serve as a role model for Army values. When the LT was concerned about the fraternization of the NCO with the SPC, he should have counseled the NCO. After the incident, the LT needs to counsel NCO about his role with SPC Jones (he is not entirely innocent). Fraternization between two may have contributed to the failure of NCO to "police up" SPC Jones. The LT also needs to recognize the difficulty in counseling the NCO because the LT drank beer with them, and he should avoid being condescending when discussing

fraternization and drinking. Do what is necessary to help the SGT to determine all options/counsel. Things to discuss in counseling: Articles of UCMJ, the impact on his career and family, the LTs intentions for recommendation for punishment, and help SGT understand how the situation escalated. The LT will probably have to use other resources (JAG) to be able to communicate options clearly to Soldier.

### Vignette # 7: Reassignments

Four months into LT Ballard's first assignment as tank PL in Korea, he learns from his PSG that one of his Soldiers, CPL Rogers has been receiving numerous phone calls and letters from his mother, in which she pleads for her son to return home. The CPL is an only child and his mother was very dependent upon him before he left for Korea. She lives near Ft. Hood, where CPL Rogers was stationed prior to leaving for Korea. Now, she has separated from CPL Rogers' father, who is harassing and stalking her. This barrage of distressing messages from the States continues and he is only half through his tour of duty when CPL Rogers requests a PCS back home to take care of his mother. LT Ballard believes him to be a good Soldier and that he is not using this situation to leave Korea. The LT recommends to the CO that the Soldier be compassionately reassigned, but the CO refuses.

During this same time period, another Soldier, SGT Stone requests a reassignment back home to handle his divorce and his request is also refused. While on leave, however, SGT Stone received the reassignment from a recruiter at Ft. Hood, and never returns to Korea. The CO has the jurisdiction to bring him back to Korea, but decides to let the reassignment stand.

#### Themes for Vignette # 7: Reassignments

1. Be proactive
4. Be approachable
6. Be consistent
7. Be a good communicator
9. Be a role model
10. Know your Soldiers

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 7: Reassignments

Verify story from CPL Rogers to ascertain if his mother is really in imminent danger. Did CO really release SGT Stone? If so, were their extenuating circumstances, or is the CO really being inconsistent/unfair? The LT must provide the consistent (fair) vision of leadership that the CO does not appear to be providing. The LT can make a case to CO for CPL Rogers.

There are other options the LT can choose beside a PCS and he has to use all resources. Time may be critical in a situation when domestic violence/stalking is involved. He can contact the mother directly or local authorities or grant emergency leave. LT should help CPL Rogers help himself first (e.g., provide info on options available – Red Cross assistance; Is she dependent, can she move on post?). The LT has to support the CO's decision, while ensuring that Soldier's performance and well-being doesn't suffer. He could use NCOs and Chain of Command whenever possible to help take care of the Soldiers (e.g., ask PSG to have 1SG make case to CO for CPL Rogers).

### Vignette # 8: Soldier with Family Issues

In the field, SGT Fine is normally a squared away Soldier. However, domestic problems have escalated over the last six weeks and are interfering with his performance of duties. The first indication of a problem was his persistent lateness. Verbal counseling did nothing to alleviate the problem. In fact, he arrived later and later until LT Parker had no choice but to give him corrective training. Nothing changed and the only way he made it to PT on time was if another NCO woke him up. LT Parker was later informed that SGT Fine was not paying his rent and writing bad checks. Financial counseling was offered, but SGT Fine was not receptive. LT Parker received multiple phone calls from Mrs. Fine claiming that her husband was routinely getting drunk and physically abusing her. LT Parker questioned SGT Fine about the spousal abuse allegations, in which SGT Fine indicated that his wife instigated the violence and that he was injured as a result of her throwing objects at him.

The unit is preparing to deploy to a combat theater of operations, the unit is shorthanded, and SGT Fine is the best gunner. The actions of this Soldier have not had any apparent ill effect on the rest of the platoon. However, LT Parker and PSG are spending an inordinate amount of time dealing with this Soldier and his problems. In a conversation between the CO and LT Parker, the CO requested an update on SGT Fine.

#### Themes for Vignette # 8: Soldier with Family Issues

1. Be proactive
3. When in charge, take charge
6. Be consistent
7. Be a good communicator
10. Know your Soldiers

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 8: Soldier with Family Issues

The LT is either unaware or does not act immediately when he senses a problem with the Soldier. Part of this would have been an investigation after the second or third time the Soldier was late for PT. The earlier he communicated with the SGT and the PSG, the sooner he could have developed a plan, began documenting misdeeds, and used his NCOs to implement the plan, such as designating an NCO to escort the SGT to appointments. The LT did not know what was going on in the Soldiers' lives. A Summarized Article 15 should have been done at this point. It stays local and he can still have a good career. Another option is a Field Grade Article 15 with a suspended reduction in rank.

Once the allegations of spousal abuse were made, the LT must consider the immediate welfare of the wife and notify his CO with recommendations, such as a no contact order and a reduction in rank. The LT needs to recognize when the situation is out of his hands.

### Vignette # 9: Substance Abuse

LT Wright receives his first PLT just as he is arriving in the theater of operations. The outgoing PL briefs LT Wright on the status of the PLT, providing information on the personal and professional standings of each Soldier. In particular, he warns LT Wright about the ongoing drug and alcohol abuse of SPC Harper. He tells the LT that due to "technicalities" SPC Harper has avoided any processes of separation. Combat is eminent, and the unit is short-handed. The CO asked the LT to decide whether to keep SPC Harper or to send him home. He reasons that SPC Harper is an adequate Soldier and can be controlled in the isolated environment. During several weeks of tactical combat operations, SPC Harper performs exceptionally well, playing a key role in the maneuvers. Thinking that the problem had resolved itself in those weeks, the LT pushes the concern to the back of his mind.

As soon as combat ceases, he and two other Soldiers begin buying an unknown drug from locals while guarding a checkpoint. The situation comes to light after one of the other Soldiers begins hallucinating while in the guard tower.

#### Themes for Vignette # 9: Substance Abuse

1. Be proactive
2. Be humble
4. Be approachable
6. Be consistent
7. Be a good communicator
8. Be a learner
9. Be a role model
10. Know your Soldiers

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 9: Substance Abuse

The prior platoon leader had difficulty balancing Army standards (on drug use) with mission accomplishment (needed every guy he could get) and was not proactive. This makes it all the more important to get to know the unit as soon as possible and make every effort to approach Soldiers and use NCOs to monitor high risk. The LT should have set expectations for unit early, paying special attention to high risk Soldiers. This involved delegating the monitoring of high risk Soldiers when he knows he would be completely engaged in tactical thinking and could not adequately monitor without assistance. Accidents/problems occur in more relaxed environments because everyone lets their guard down and fail to be as vigilant as when in combat.

In hindsight, the LT learned that he must balance safety with mission accomplishment. He must understand that a trade-off occurred; to keep SPC Harper and not constantly monitor him, the LT compromised safety of other Soldiers. The LT probably not knowledgeable about ramifications of drug addiction.

The Soldier should be counseled and informed of his rights. Isolate SPC Harper and start taking statements for court marshal. Hand him over for detainment until he can be court marshaled. Adjust resources/plans/organization based on manning situation. Make a safety brief to the unit addressing the drug issue with NCOs and unit. Use your NCO's to determine if other instances of drug abuse exist and to gather details.

### Vignette # 10: Shortcuts

LT Wilson's first assignment as PL is at NTC. Initially, he does not know his PSG or how things are done at NTC. The PSG is an expert on the ins and outs at NTC and LT Wilson quickly develops a good rapport with him. In a short amount of time, the positive work relationship develops into a close personal friendship off duty. Because the PSG knows NTC so well, he takes advantage of any opportunity to cut corners. He believes that he knows how to do things more efficiently without getting caught. There are no blatant instances of insubordination, but LT Wilson is becoming suspicious that his orders are not being carried out as given. Recently, in a training exercise, LT Wilson issued an Op order for a tactical road march with the march order of 3 – 1 – 4 – 2. Red 2 normally leads, but the LT wanted to see how Red 3 would perform as lead tank commander. In communicating the orders to the Soldiers, the PSG changed the order to 2 – 1 – 4 – 3. The personal friendship and the PSG's expertise, makes it awkward for LT Wilson to address his suspicions. On a return drive from training, the PSG encourages LT Wilson to take an unauthorized route as a shortcut. He says that he has taken the route before, that it is safe, and will save a lot of time. LT Wilson defers to his judgment and takes the shortcut. The vehicle is stopped by an OC who verbally reprimands them, telling them that this is a live-fire area.

#### Themes for Vignette # 10: Shortcuts

3. When in charge, take charge
5. Be confident
6. Be consistent
7. Be a good communicator
8. Be a learner
9. Be a role model

#### Expert Solution for Vignette # 10: Shortcuts

In developing his relationship with the PSG, the LT failed to balance the need for respect as authority and decision maker with the need to be a learner and to be liked. His lack of experience, and lack of confidence in his authority caused him to focus on personal, rather than professional, relationship development. It is important to create the professional relationship first. It is easier to develop the professional role early, than to re-negotiate roles later. The first thing the new PL should have done was to respectfully communicate his role and expectations with his PSG and platoon. Now, the LT must take responsibility for his actions and have integrity to own his decisions. The LT was responsible for the decision regarding the route, but failed to stand firm on a simple decision (an unauthorized route is UNAUTHORIZED).

In the instance of the training exercise, the countermand may have been avoided if the LT had communicated intent along with the order. It is not always possible to provide the intent of an order, but doing so whenever possible will avoid misunderstandings. In taking responsibility, the LT should call his CO and admit the mistake. The CO should

hear it from the LT, not from the NTC O/C or anyone else. The PSG should witness the LT taking responsibility for this decision. This establishes that, since the LT will be accountable, he may or may not want to take the PSG's advice in the future. The LT should listen to his PSG's advice for solutions that are more effective or efficient, but if that advice compromises Army values, safety, or the LT's status as a role model, then the LT must maintain his professional role as decision maker. Verbal counseling to PSG should indicate that the LT knew his judgment was clouded by the friendship but will not be in the future. The LT must re-establish his powerbase and his role as decision maker and Platoon Leader. In the future, the LT should communicate his intent to the PSG, listen to advice from his PSG, and make an informed decision.

## **Participant Response Form:**

### **Army Green Training Product**

\* It is recommended that the themes are presented for training vignettes only. This product is arranged such that vignettes 1 and 2 serve as the pre-test (no themes presented), vignettes 3 through 8 serve as training (themes presented), and vignettes 9 and 10 serve as the post-test (no themes presented). This is the arrangement used in the companion research report to this training product:

Hinkle, R. K., Karrasch, A. I., & Burke, T. J. (In Preparation). Army Green: Training Non-Tactical Problem Solving by Platoon Leaders. (ARI Research Report). Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Davis had just taken over as PL when he receives orders of deployment to a combat theater of operations in two months. In reviewing the PT records for his platoon, he notices that PFC Freeman failed his last two APFTs. However, there is no record that he was flagged, counseled, or given any special PT program. He is given the test and once again fails due to his inability to run without periodically stopping to walk. He is an otherwise good guy with a strong desire to serve. LT Davis believes that, in a short time, he can motivate him to pass on his own, so, for now, gives him a passing score to allow him to deploy. The LT warns PFC Freeman that he will not allow any promotions until he passes the APFT. The unit deploys with PFC Freeman. LT Davis puts him on a remedial PT program for running and goes to great lengths to motivate him to run, but 6 months later, he fails again.

Everyone in the platoon is aware of the situation with PFC Freeman. His name appears on the promotion list, along with several others who did pass the APFT, and LT Davis is powerless to stop PFC Freeman from being promoted.

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

It is the first month of LT Sharp's assignment as Platoon Leader. He is still getting to know his troops and the unit is deployed to NTC. During an equipment inspection, he notices that equipment is being double-counted. Once the inspector moves on and starts inventorying the next vehicle, the PSG tells a Private to remove a MILES cable that had already been accounted for and to place it in his tank. As the SFC continues on with the inspector, LT Sharp approaches the Private and tells him to return the cable. The Private indicates that he is following the SFC's instructions and the LT tells him that he will speak to the SFC and not to worry about it. Later, the SFC questions the Private concerning the cable. The Private tells him that the LT ordered him to return the cable.

LT Sharp waits until the next day to talk with the SFC. The SFC becomes visibly upset and defends his actions by insisting he did nothing wrong. He says he was only trying to protect a soldier who lost a cable and would have to pay for it out of his own pocket.

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Adams' assignment was to take over as PL for a platoon, of which the former PL was relieved of duty. The PSG has been performing the duties of PL, before the former PL's removal and in the interim. Prior to arriving, LT Adams was excited and felt prepared to take the leadership position. However, he had some apprehension about his PSG, 37 year old SFC Bandy, with 17 years of service. When he told classmates about his upcoming assignment, some made comments about SFC being highly competent both technically and tactically, but also condescending and demoralizing to his soldiers. Upon arrival, LT Adams scheduled a meeting with SFC Bandy to take place immediately.

After this initial meeting, LT Adams' uneasiness about working with SFC Bandy was confirmed. SFC Bandy did most of the talking, telling LT Adams how things had been done in the past, and what to expect in the future. Soon, it became apparent that SFC Bandy intended to continue performing the PL responsibilities. LT Adams noticed that in the motor pool, the duties customarily assigned to the PSG were not being done. Reasoning that the work needed to be done regardless, LT Adams began performing those tasks.

During the first mission, LT Adams let SFC Bandy take charge and the results were dismal. Prior to the second mission, LT Adams tells SFC Bandy that he is ready to take over and gives orders. SFC Bandy agrees with the orders saying it's the right course of action and then gets on the net commanding the platoon and begins contradicting orders. They are in the field for 3 months. Outside of tactical maneuvers, the roles and responsibilities of PL and PSG appear to be appropriately assumed and executed. However, SFC Bandy continues to countermand LT Adams' orders during maneuvers. During the last mission of this 3 month period, SFC Bandy disobeys an order resulting in LT Adams' tank being destroyed. While on the net, LT Adams' loses all composure and an argument ensues. They return from the field that week. A few days later, LT Adams goes to the motor pool, but cannot find SFC Bandy. LT Adams calls for SFC Bandy to come to the motor pool. SFC Bandy is furious when he arrives and begins yelling at LT Adams.

Be proactive  
Be humble  
When in charge, take charge  
Be approachable  
Be confident  
Be consistent  
Be a good communicator  
Be a learner  
Be a role model  
Know your Soldiers

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Bryant and his PSG have had several counseling sessions with 21 year old PFC Cruz about his family obligations encroaching on his professional duties. During counseling, PFC Cruz says that his wife does not have a driver's license and is totally dependent upon him for any activities requiring her to leave their home, such as going to the store or taking one of their three children to doctor's appointment. To no avail, LT Bryant and his PSG have advised PFC Cruz to get his wife a driver's license, providing him with phone numbers of on-post services that can assist them and escorting him to Family Readiness Groups. LT

Bryant asked PFC Cruz if he will bring his wife in so they can all discuss possible solutions. In the counseling session, PFC Cruz voiced agreement that changes must be made, but his wife openly and adamantly refused to make any lifestyle changes.

Several months later, LT Bryant arrives at JRTC with his PLT for mission rehearsal exercises in preparation for deployment to a combat theater of operations. In a few weeks, the unit will be deploying for at least a year. The PSG tells LT Bryant that he just discovered that Mrs. Cruz is 7 months pregnant and PFC Cruz will be in the field when the child is due. Up to this point, PFC Cruz has not mentioned the pregnancy. Within two days, his wife is calling him to come back home to take her to the grocery store and to doctor's appointments. You discover from PFC Cruz that, other than an initial visit, she has not gone to any of her appointments.

Be proactive  
Be humble  
When in charge, take charge  
Be approachable  
Be confident  
Be consistent  
Be a good communicator  
Be a learner  
Be a role model  
Know your Soldiers

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Riddle has been a PL in Korea for 5 months. The CO tasked LT Riddle to send seven tanks to Seoul to be painted. Tanks in the battalion had not been sent by rail for seven years. There was no one to ask how this was done, when it should be done, or how to coordinate the logistics. After much fruitless research, LT Riddle finally found someone, a civilian working on post at the division transportation office, who agreed to help with the transport.

Two challenges that arose during preparation for transport were the vast amount of paperwork required and obtaining the necessary equipment to secure the tanks on the railcar. The request forms were unfamiliar to the LT and the CO could provide very little advice on how to complete them. The task was arduous, but the LT completed them, filed them, and the transport was authorized. The civilian contractor did not have the shackles needed to tie down the tanks. The LT realized that the shackles needed were the same as those on the HEMTT Fueler. Through an extensive amount of coordination, LT Riddle secured usage of the shackles.

The last task was to unload the tanks and inventory the equipment. The PSG was given this task with a deadline of the day before the transport. When the LT asked about the status, the PSG assured him that this was complete and the tanks were ready to go. The tanks were loaded on the railcar, secured, inspected, and sent on their way.

The following evening, the CO knocks on the LT's door saying that he thinks there is a problem. The painter had called the CO indicating that a machine gun was in one of the tanks.

Be proactive  
Be humble  
When in charge, take charge  
Be approachable  
Be confident  
Be consistent  
Be a good communicator  
Be a learner  
Be a role model  
Know your Soldiers

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Crowley is 23 years old, serving his first assignment as PL in Korea. He receives a call in the middle of the night regarding one of his soldiers, 31 year old SGT Smith. Previously, SGT Smith has exhibited exemplar behavior and has a good reputation. He appears to be a responsible soldier and performs well within his unit. His wife resides in New Jersey and is expecting their first child. LT Crowley's only concern about SGT Smith has been his friendship with a soldier from another platoon, SPC Jones, whom he knows to be a good soldier in the field, but has displayed a drinking problem and some behavioral issues in garrison.

Earlier on this particular night, LT Crowley had bumped into SGT Smith, who asked the LT to have a drink with him and SPC Jones. LT Crowley told him he was meeting friends later, but had time for a beer or two. Some time after the LT left, SGT Smith and SPC Jones decided to go shopping and found themselves in a discussion with a shop owner over the price of an item. The discussion became heated when SPC Jones somehow offended the salesman and a physical altercation ensued. SPC Jones fell through the window of the shop and both soldiers were arrested and charged with public intoxication and assault in Korean Federal Court. SGT Smith had nothing to do with the altercation but was still charged, albeit with a lesser charge than SPC Jones. The shop owner also claimed that the soldiers were trying to shoplift from his store.

LT Crowley and SGT Smith meet with lawyers from JAG to discuss SGT Smith's situation. The US has an agreement with Korea in which soldiers convicted by Korean Federal Courts will stay in Korea until the sentence is complete. The likely sentence will be three years and LT Crowley feels certain that both soldiers will be convicted if tried. The JAG suggests that SGT Smith consider an in-court settlement agreement that would require a) admission of guilt and b) \$700 in reparations. SGT Smith adamantly claims his innocence and is reluctant to pay reparations.

Be proactive  
Be humble  
When in charge, take charge  
Be approachable  
Be confident  
Be consistent  
Be a good communicator  
Be a learner  
Be a role model  
Know your Soldiers

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

Four months into LT Ballard's first assignment as tank PL in Korea, he learns from his PSG that one of his soldiers, CPL Rogers has been receiving numerous phone calls and letters from his mother, in which she pleads for her son to return home. The CPL is an only child and his mother was very dependent upon him before he left for Korea. She lives near Ft. Hood, where CPL Rogers was stationed prior to leaving for Korea. Now, she has separated from CPL Rogers' father, who is harassing and stalking her. This barrage of distressing messages from the States continues and he is only half through his tour of duty when CPL Rogers requests a PCS back home to take care of his mother. LT Ballard believes him to be a good soldier and that he is not using this situation to leave Korea. The LT recommends to the CO that the soldier be compassionately reassigned, but the CO refuses.

During this same time period, another soldier, SGT Stone requests a reassignment back home to handle his divorce and his request is also refused. While on leave, however, SGT Stone received the reassignment from a recruiter at Ft. Hood and never returns to Korea. The CO has the jurisdiction to bring him back to Korea, but decides to let the reassignment stand.

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Be proactive  
Be humble  
When in charge, take charge  
Be approachable  
Be confident  
Be consistent  
Be a good communicator  
Be a learner  
Be a role model  
Know your Soldiers

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

In the field, SGT Fine is normally a squared away soldier. However, domestic problems have escalated over the last six weeks and are interfering with his performance of duties. The first indication of a problem was his persistent lateness. Verbal counseling did nothing to alleviate the problem. In fact, he arrived later and later until LT Parker had no choice but to give him corrective training. Nothing changed and the only way he made it to PT on time was if another NCO woke him up. LT Parker was later informed that SGT Fine was not paying his rent and writing bad checks. Financial counseling was offered, but SGT Fine was not receptive. LT Parker began receiving phone calls from Mrs. Fine claiming that her husband was routinely getting drunk and beating her. LT Parker questioned SGT Fine about the spousal abuse allegations, in which SGT Fine indicated that his wife instigated the violence and that he was injured as a result of her throwing objects at him.

The unit is preparing to deploy to a combat theater of operations, the unit is shorthanded, and SGT Fine is the best gunner. The actions of this soldier have not had any apparent ill effect on the rest of the platoon. However, LT Parker and PSG are spending an inordinate amount of time dealing with this soldier and his problems. In a conversation between the CO and LT Parker, the CO requested an update on SGT Fine.

Be proactive  
Be humble  
When in charge, take charge  
Be approachable  
Be confident  
Be consistent  
Be a good communicator  
Be a learner  
Be a role model  
Know your Soldiers

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Wright receives his first PLT just as he is arriving in the theater of operations. The outgoing PL briefs LT Wright on the status of the PLT, providing information on the personal and professional standings of each soldier. In particular, he warns LT Wright about the ongoing drug and alcohol abuse of SPC Harper. He tells the LT that due to "technicalities", SPC Harper has avoided any processes of separation. Combat is eminent, and the unit is short-handed. The CO asked the LT to decide whether to keep SPC Harper or to send him home. He reasons that SPC Harper is an adequate soldier and can be controlled in the isolated environment. During several weeks of tactical combat operations, SPC Harper performs exceptionally well, playing a key role in the maneuvers. Thinking that the problem had resolved itself in those weeks, the LT pushes the concern to the back of his mind.

As soon as combat ceases, he and two other soldiers begin buying an unknown drug from locals while guarding a checkpoint. The situation comes to light after one of the other soldiers begins hallucinating while in the guard tower.

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

Participant # \_\_\_\_\_

LT Wilson's first assignment as PL is at NTC. Initially, he does not know his PSG or how things are done at NTC. The PSG is an expert on the ins and outs at NTC and LT Wilson quickly develops a good rapport with him. In a short amount of time, the positive work relationship develops into a close personal friendship off duty. Because the PSG knows NTC so well, he takes advantage of any opportunity to cut corners. He believes that he knows how to do things more efficiently without getting caught. There are no blatant instances of insubordination, but LT Wilson is becoming suspicious that his orders are not being carried out as given. Recently, in a training exercise, LT Wilson issued an Op order for a tactical road march with the march order of 3 – 1 – 4 – 2. Red 2 normally leads, but the LT wanted to see how Red 3 would perform as lead tank commander. In communicating the orders to the soldiers, the PSG changed the order to 2 – 1 – 4 – 3. The personal friendship and the PSG's expertise, makes it awkward for LT Wilson to address his suspicions.

On a return drive from training, the PSG encourages LT Wilson to take an unauthorized route as a shortcut. He says that he has taken the route before, that it is safe, and will save a lot of time. LT Wilson defers to his judgment and takes the shortcut. The vehicle is stopped by an observer controller who verbally reprimands them, telling them that this is a live-fire area.

Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation:

Describe the leader challenge for LT:

What would have been the best COA for LT?

What is the best COA now?

## Rater Scoring Sheet:

### Army Green Training Product

Instructions to Evaluator: Please read the LT leader themes and their definitions. These themes have been developed by the 16<sup>th</sup> CAV Regiment and the U.S. Army Research Institute based on leader doctrine and current practice, and have been targeted for training to prepare new LTs for taking charge of a platoon. If you have any questions or need any clarification of those themes, do not hesitate to ask the ARI POC – Dr. Carl W. Lickteig at 502-624-2613 or by emailing [carl.lickteig@us.army.mil](mailto:carl.lickteig@us.army.mil) . After a clear understanding of the themes, please read the vignette and expert solutions. Finally rate each participant's response to the vignette by answering the three questions below.

If you have any questions, please ask before you begin. Thank you in advance for your time and expertise on this effort.

1. Please rate the **analysis of this situation** by circling the appropriate rating below. The rating scale is developed such that a “1” represents a lack of critical thinking about what the given situation involves, a “4” represents a quick assessment of basic considerations, and a “7” would represent a thorough consideration of all issues involved in the immediate situation and follow-on implications.

1.....	2.....	3.....	4.....	5.....	6.....	7
Weak Analysis of Situation	Basic Considerations Covered	Strong Analysis of Situation				

2. Please rate the **solution** that was developed for the given situation by circling the appropriate rating below. A “1” on the rating scale would indicate a poor solution, a “4” rating would indicate a good solution that addresses the most pressing issues involved, and a rating of “7” represents a complete and thorough solution to the immediate and follow-on problems and even preventive measures to ensure no further difficulties.

1.....	2.....	3.....	4.....	5.....	6.....	7
Poor Solution	Fair Solution	Strong Solution				

*Continues*

3. Please rate the **extent of leadership exemplified** in the analysis, solution development, and discussion of the leader challenge in this participant's response. A rating of "1" indicates no consideration of leader themes, a rating of "4" indicates incomplete application of some leader themes, and a "7" on the rating scale indicates that the participant applied all appropriate leader themes. For example, a "7" indicates highly proactive, high confidence, taking charge, being highly approachable, highly confident, highly consistent and etc. as necessary for a given situation.

1.....	2.....	3.....	4.....	5.....	6.....	7
Lack of Leadership is evident		Some Leadership evident			Strong Leadership is evident	